

Message Text

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FOLLOWING REPEAT NEW DELHI 6847 ACTION SECSTATE INFO ISLAMABAD,
BOMBAY, CALCUTTA, MADRAS MAY 23

QUOTE

S E C R E T NEW DELHI 6847

EXDIS

S/S PASS TO SECRETARY KISSINGER

SECSTATE PASS OTHER POSTS AS APPROPRIATE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PFOR, MCAP, IN

SUBJECT: INDIAN NUCLEAR TEST

SUMMARY: ".... BY THE TIME ANY NTH COUNTRY NEGOTIATION
IS FAR ADVANCED, IT IS PROBABLE THAT COMMUNIST CHINA WILL HAVE
EXPLODED A NUCLEAR DEVICE.

THE MINIMUM CONSEQUENCE WILL BE THAT THE PRESSURES FOR
THE EXPANSION OF THE NUCLEAR CLUB WOULD MULTIPLY. ALL THE COUN-
TRIES WHICH HAVE BEEN OR MAY BE THREATENED BY A POWERFUL COMMU-
NIST CHINA WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER ACQUIRING NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

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WHATEVER THEIR PRESENT VIEWS, INDIA AND JAPAN AT LEAST WOULD
OVER A PERIOD OF TIME BE PUSHED IN THAT DIRECTION OF DEVEL-
OPING A NUCLEAR ARSENAL." HENRY A. KISSINGER, THE NECESSITY
FOR CHOICE, NEW YORK, HARPER AND ROW, 1961. END SUMMARY.

1. FOR SOME YEARS NOW THOUGHTFUL PERSONS IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAVE CONCERNED THEMSELVES WITH "THE NTH COUNTRY PROBLEM," WONDERING WHAT MIGHT BE DONE TO PREVENT THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. INDIA HAS NOW SUPPLIED THE ANSWER WHICH DR. KISSINGER ANTICIPATED MANY YEARS AGO. NOTHING WILL BE DONE. THERE ARE MEASURES WHICH BY A CERTAIN DEFINITION WOULD SUCCEED. THE UNITED STATES COULD BLOW UP ANY NATION WHICH EXPLODED A NUCLEAR DEVICE. THE UNITED STATES COULD MAKE SUCH A MASSIVE COMMITMENT OF ITS OWN WEALTH TO INCREASING THE WEALTH OF THE PRE-NUCLEAR NATIONS SUCH THAT THEY MIGHT REST CONTENT TO STAY THAT WAY. BUT IT WON'T AND THEY PROBABLY WOULDN'T. AS SECRETARY SCHLESINGER WROTE IN 1966, " THE EFFORT TO DISSUADE ADDITIONAL STATES FROM ACQUIRING NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES, WHILE GOOD IN ITSELF, IS NOT LIKELY TO BE WHOLLY SUCCESSFUL. WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE REALISTICALLY THAT THE LONG-RUN PROBLEM IS HOW TO LIVE WITH THE SPREAD WITH MINIMAL RISK."

2. THE INDIAN DECISION WAS NOT ONLY ANTICIPATED BY DR. KISSINGER AT THE END OF THE 1950'S (WHEN THAT PARTICULAR ARTICLE WAS WRITTEN) BUT HAS BEEN MORE PRECISELY FORECAST WITH IN THE GOVERNMENT IN RECENT YEARS AND MONTHS. THE ASSESSMENT OF THE SUPERB NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY MEMORANDUM 156: INDIAN NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENTS, (SEPTEMBER 1972) WAS "THAT OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS THE CHANCES ARE ABOUT EVEN THAT INDIA WILL DETONATE A NUCLEAR DEVICE." IN APRIL 1973 OUR ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION REPRESENTATIVE IN BOMBAY GAVE US HIS VIEW THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA MAY WELL HAVE DECIDED TO DEMONSTRATE ITS CAPABILITY BY EXPLODING A DEVICE AND MIGHT BE CURRENTLY WORKING TO THIS END. THE NSSM SUGGESTS THAT INDIA WILL "PROBABLY NOT BE ABLE TO DEVELOP IRMB'S BEFORE THE 1980'S " WHICH SEEMS ABOUT RIGHT. THUS SHE WILL NOT HAVE A WORKABLE DELIVERY SYSTEM FOR SOME TIME, IF INDEED SHE ELECTS TO MAKE THE INVESTMENT. BUT SHE NOW HAS "THE BOMB" (AS IT IS CALLED HERABOUTS IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION) AND THE WORLD HAS ENTERED THIS NEW ERA.

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3. THE CAPITALIST PRESS SEEMS TO HAVE GOT ONTO THE IDEA THAT THE BOMB WAS SET OFF TO RAISE INDIAN MORALE IN A PERIOD OF DOMESTIC DEPRESSION AND CRISIS. TO SOME EXTENT THAT WAS UNDOUBTEDLY THE GOVERNMENT'S INTENTION; IN ANY CASE IT SEEMS TO HAVE HAD THAT EFFECT. THE INITIAL REACTION HERE WAS WHAT MAY BE DESCRIBED AS JUBILATION TINGED WITH SOME OF THE LESS AGREEABLE TRAITS OFTEN ASCRIBED TO INDIANS. ANY COUNTRY WOULD BE PROUD OF THE ACCOMPLISHMENT, PARTICULARLY A NATION THAT IS FOND OF THINKING OF ITSELF AS THE LEADER OF THE THIRD WORLD, AND ANY GOVERNMENT SEEKING TO REINSTATE A MEASURE OF NATIONAL PROGRESS IN AN OTHERWISE DISMAL SITUATION MIGHT BE EXPECTED TO CONSIDER SUCH A STEP. (SOME SOUR NOTES ARE BEGINNING TO BE HEARD AND SEEN IN THE PRESS -- BOTH EDITORIALS

AND CARTOONS --

SUGGESTING THAT POOR STARVING PEASANTS ARE NOT LIKELY TO BE JUBILANT VERY LONG AND ALSO SUGGESTING SOME SKEPTICISM ABOUT INDIA'S INTENTIONS TO REALLY KEEP ITS NUCLEAR CAPABILITY PEACEFUL). HOWEVER, WE HAVE NO PROOF THAT THE TIMING WAS ANYTHING MORE THAN A RANDOM (FROM A POLITICAL SENSE) OUTCOME OF A BUREAUCRATIC DECISION MADE QUITE A WAY BACK. THE INDIANS SAY 1971, WHICH COULD WELL BE THE CASE. THESE THINGS GET STARTED EASILY ENOUGH. ONCE THEY ARE NEAR COMPLETION -- THE POLITICAL REWARDS AT HOME AND ABROAD BEING NEAR TO FANTASTIC, THE CONSEQUENCES OF A FAILURE (ASSUMING ADEQUATE SECRECY) BEING MINIMAL -- NO PRIME MINISTER WOULD DARE TO HALT THE PROCESS. NOT THIS ONE.

4. THANKS TO THE SECRETARY, THE UNITED STATES REACTION SO FAR HAS BEEN LESS COSTLY THAN IT PROBABLY WAS GOING TO BE. THE STATEMENT FIRST PROPOSED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WHILE MILD, WAS NOT MILD ENOUGH. WITHIN MOMENTS, HOWEVER, THE SECRETARY WEIGHED IN FROM DAMASCUS TO SAY THERE WAS NOT TO BE ANY DEPARTMENT STATEMENT AND THAT, IF QUERIED, THE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN WAS TO MAKE A "LOW-KEY REPEAT LOW-KEY RESPONSE". IT IS WELL THAT WE HAVE CHOSEN THIS POSTURE. UNDER THE DURESS OF ECONOMIC FAILURES THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA HAS BEEN SLOWLY MOVING TOWARD MORE MODERATE ECONOMIC POLICIES AND TOWARD BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE US. THERE IS NEAR PANIC AMONG THOSE OF THE LEFT, WHETHER COMMUNIST OR CONGRESS, ABOUT THIS CHANGE. EVEN THE SOVIETS ARE WORRIED, AS OUR INTELLIGENCE
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MAKES CLEAR. IN THIS ATMOSPHERE THERE HAVE BEEN MANY OUT HERE WHO HAVE BEEN LOOKING FOR SOMETHING, ANYTHING, TO HANG ON US. THUS THE INDIAN PRESS, WHILE RECORDING THE MODERATE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT POSITION, HAS DONE MUCH TO CONVEY THE OPPOSITE IMPRESSION. A MAY 21 TIMES OF INDIA DISPATCH FROM WASHINGTON HEADED "U.S.A. MAY TRY TO ISOLATE INDIA" BEGAN QUOTE IT WAS BECOMING INCREASINGLY CLEAR HERE TODAY THAT AN IMMENSE BARRAGE OF 'DAMN INDIA' PROPAGANDA WOULD BE UNLEASHED IN THE U.S. UNQUOTE. A GENERALIZED EFFORT HAS BEEN MADE TO PORTRAY THE NEW YORK TIMES AS A MOUTHPIECE OF THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION. DESPITE THIS AND SIMILAR ARTICLES, THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA HAS MADE IT KNOWN, ALBEIT VERY QUIETLY, THAT THEY HAVE TAKEN NOTE OF THE FACT THAT OUR REACTION WAS MODERATE. THE SECRETARY'S FIRM AND IMMEDIATE REACTION HAS OBVIOUSLY BEEN ESSENTIALLY SUCCESSFUL, NOT LEAST IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY ANGRY OR THREATENING STATEMENTS IN THE CENTO COMMUNIQUE ISSUED YESTERDAY IN WASHINGTON.

5. TODAY'S PRESS (MAY 23) PRESENTS A PROBLEM, HOWEVER, AS A RESULT OF SECRETARY SCHLESINGER'S STATEMENT THAT THE UNITED STATES IS WITHDRAWING ITS NUCLEAR PROTECTION FROM INDIA. THIS IN ANY EVENT IS HOW THE STORY PLAYS HERE. "USA NOT TO PROVIDE PROTECTION IF INDIA BUILDS N-WEAPONS" SCREAMS

THE HEADLINES OF THE INDIAN EXPRESS, THE NATION'S WIDEST CIRCULATED PAPER. "US THREAT TO WITHDRAW NON-EXISTENT 'PROTECTION' ANNOUNCES THE PATRIOT, A COMMUNIST JOURNAL. THE MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS HAS ASKED US FOR A COPY OF SECRETARY SCHLESINGER'S REMARKS.

6. WHAT TO DO? THIS SEEMS OBVIOUS ENOUGH WITH RESPECT TO INDIA. WE SHOULD RESPOND TO THIS DEVELOPMENT AS WE DID TO THE ADVENT OF N MINUS ONE. OR RATHER AS WE EVENTUALLY DID. WHICH IS TO TAKE THE COUNTRY SERIOUSLY, GIVING A GOOD DOSE OF THOUGHT TO HOW ITS INTERESTS AND OURS MAY BE ACCOMMODATED, AND TAKING EMPHATIC STEPS TO BRING ABOUT SUCH ACCOMMODATION. IF THERE WERE NO OTHER REASON FOR INDIA GETTING ITSELF A BOMB, THE CONTRAST WITH THE WAY IT HAS BEEN DEALT WITH BY THE MAJOR POWERS AND THE WAY CHINA IS DEALT WITH WOULD HAVE BEEN SUFFICIENT TO AROUSE BY THE MOST WILFULLY VIRTUOUS REGIME TO ACTION. A SMALL NOT INAPPROPRIATE EXAMPLE: WHEN OUR AEC REPRESENTATIVE SECRET

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LEFT INDIA LAST ALL, THE POSITION WAS ABOLISHED. CABLES, LETTERS, TELEPHONE CALLS OF AN INCREASINGLY IMPORTAUNATE TONE HAVE DONE NOTHING TO GET US A REPRESENTATIVE BACK. FORTUNATELY, THE VARIOUS DEVICES INSTALLED TO PICK UP TRACES OF CHINESE NUCLEAR ACTIVITY WERE ABLE TO DETECT THE INDIAN EXPLOSION AS WELL.

7. WHAT OF INDIA'S NEIGHBORS? THE ANSWER TO THIS FOLLOWS FROM THE ASSERTION ABOVE. THE BIG NEIGHBORS WILL THEMSELVES HAVE TO DEAL WITH INDIA ON NEW AND LESS FAVORABLE TERMS, ALTHOUGH I DOUBT THERE WILL BE ANY PERCEPTIBLE CHANGE FOR SOME TIME TO COME. WE CAN ACCEPT THIS PROSPECT WITH EQUANIMITY. INDIA IS NOT ABOUT TO BOMB OMAHA, NOR LENINGRAD. AND PROBABLY NOT SHANGHAI. AS DR. KISSINGER WROTE IN "THE NTH COUNTRY PROBLEM," "THE POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHOULD NOT INCREASE THE WILINGNESS OF A MINOR NUCLEAR POWER TO GO TO WAR AGAINST A MAJOR OPPONENT." THE MORE COMPLICATED ISSUE ARISES MORE IN CONNECTION WITH THE SMALLER NEIGHBORS, FOR THEIR CHIEFS WILL ALSO HAVE READ KISSINGER AND WILL KNOW THAT "IF THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS NOT SYMMERTRICAL, THE COUNTRY ACQUIRING THEM FIRST MAY HAVE A VERY STRONG INCENTIVE TO EXPLOIT ITS ADVANTAGE, WHICH IT KNOWS TO BE TRANSITORY." WE CAN ONLY HOPE THAT INDIA AND HER NEIGHBORS WILL LEARN THE LESSONS OF STABILITY TO BE HAD FROM NORTH AMERICA, WHICH SOUTH ASIA NOW RATHER RESEMBLES. THE LITTLE COUNTRIES MUST LEARN TO GET ALONG WITH THE BIG COUNTRY, THE BIG COUNTRY MUST LEARN HOW TO MAKE THIS POSSIBLE, ELSE THE LITTLE COUNTRIES INVITE IN BIG COUNTRIES FROM ELSEWHERE AND YOU HAVE A CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS.

AS FOR OUR ALLY AND FRIEND, PAKISTAN, IT WOULD BE FOLLY FOR US TO LEAVE IT TO PONDER HOW TO GET ITS OWN DETERRENT. WE GATHER WE HAVE TAKEN A FIRST AND INTELLIGENT STEP AT THE CENTO MEETING BY REAFFIRMING OUR COMMITMENT TO PAKISTAN'S INDEPENDENCE AND IN-

TEGRITY. BUT THERE IS ALSO FOLLY IN GOING TOO FAR. WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER THE INDIANS WILL ATTEMPT TO DEVELOP MISSILES TO DELIVER WARHEADS, BUT WE DO KNOW THAT THEY WOULD HAVE GREATER INCENTIVE TO DO SO IF A BIG POWER -- PRESUMABLY CHINA OR THE UNITED STATES -- WERE TO BEGIN PROVIDING THE PAKS WITH A MAJOR INCREASE IN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONRY.

8. WHAT OF THE PENDING SERIES N PLUS TWO, THREE, FOUR, FIVE SIX, SEVEN, EIGHT.....? YEARS BACK SECRETARY KISSINGER SPOTTED NINETEEN, SECRET

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INCLUDING CHINA DN INDIA, AND THERE ARE SURELY MORE TODAY. WELL, WE LEAVE SUCH GLOBAL MATTERS TO DR. IKLE AND HIS COLLEAGUES. ALL WE DEAL WITH IN NEW DELHI IS ONE SIXTH OF MANKIND. WE WOULD NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT THE GENERAL TENOR OF THE ASSESSMENTS FROM OTHER CAPITALS IS THAT THE INDIAN DECISION WILL NOT MUCH AFFECT DECISIONS THERE ONE WAY OR ANOTHER. WE READ THIS TO MEAN THAT OTHER COUNTRIES WILL DO WHAT THEY THINK TO BE IN THEIR INTERESTS, MUCH AS INDIA HAS.

(CERTAINLY WE SHOULD DO NOTHING TO DISCOURAGE THE DISAPPROVING REACTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE INDIAN DECISION WHICH HAVE BEEN COMING FROM OTTAWA AND CANADA. ANY NATION THAT DECLINES TO BUILD A BOMB HAS EVERY RIGHT TO CREATE DIFFICULTIES FOR THOSE WHO DO. THE CONTRAST WITH OUR RESPONSE CAN DO NO HARM EITHER.)

WE WOULD OFFER BUT ONE THOUGHT ON THAT SUBJECT, WHICH ARISES FROM THE EXCEPTIONALLY INTERESTING COMMENT GATHERED AT ONE REMOVE FROM AMBASSADOR OSBORN TO THE EFFECT THAT JAPAN IS A MUTAMRC AMONG NATIONS. INSTEAD OF GOING THE SAME OLD HOBBSIAN ROUTE OF DUDING UP IN SHINING ARMOR AND SETTING OFF TO LOOK FOR A FIGHT, JAPAN HAS DECIDED TO REMAIN UNARMED AND TO BECOME IMMENSELY WEALTHY, SUCH THAT THE WARRING WORLD OUTSIDE ITS BORDERS COULD NOT POSSIBLY DO WITHOUT IT IN ITS EVER MORE AFFLUENT STATE. RATHER IN THE WAY THE CRIMINALS OF THE WORLD -- AND SOME NOT QUITE CRIMINAL -- NEED THE SWISS BANKING SYSTEM. THIS MAY NOT BE AMBASSADOR OSBORN'S CURRENT VIEW, AND IT MAY NEVER HAVE BEEN, BUT IT IS A FASCINATING IDEA. THE UNITED STATES SHOULD REWARD THIS DISPOSITION, LITTLE AS WE MIGHT ENJOY IT IN PLACES SUCH AS SWEDEN AND (WHO KNOWS?) DENMARK. OUGHT WE NOT, FOR EXAMPLE, MOUNT A MAJOR EFFORT TO GET JAPAN A SEAT ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL? AS FOR THE GREAT, SO FOR THE SMALL. OUR IMPRESSION HERE THAT PAKISTAN HAS A CHANCE OF ATTAINING A DECENT FOR EXAMPLE, IT IS OUR STANDARD OF LIVING IN THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS. AS MUCH AS AN OUTSIDE COUNTRY CAN DO, SURELY WE SHOULD DO. BUT AS I SAY, THESE MATTERS WE LEAVE TO DR. IKLE WITH LONG STANDING ADMIRATION AND RESPECT.

9. AS FOR OUR ONE SIXTH OF MANKIND, THE JUBLIATION OF THE BOMB WILL SOON PASS (ALTHOUGH NOT PERHAPS THE INCREASING TEMPTATION TO DO SOMETHING WITH THE POTENTIAL) BUT THE PRIVATION WILL REMAIN. AND WORSEN. - IF THERE ARE ONE OR TWO PEOPLE IN THE DEPART-

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MENT WHO ARE NOW THINKING ABOUT INDIA, LET ME SAY THAT THE CENTRAL QUESTION IS WHETHER INDIA IS TO BE A REASONABLY STABLE NATIONAL WILL HAS SOME SENSE OF PROGRESS AND FUTURE HOPE, OR WHETHER IT CONTINUE TO SLIP INTO DISORDER AND DESPAIR IN WHICH IRRESPONSIBLE FORCES COULD ASSUME CONTROL OF INDIA'S NEW NUCLEAR APABILITIES.

THIS IS NOT A QUESTION FOR THE UNITED STATES ALONE. THE CENTRAL ABIDING ISSUE OF THE SEVENTIES IS WHETHER A WORLD SYSTEM CAN BE CONTRIVED IN WHICH THE SURPLUS CAPITAL BEING ACCUMULATED BY THE OIL PRODUCING COUNTRIES IS INVESTED IN COUNTRIES SUCH AS INDIA, USING TECHNOLOGY AND CAPITAL GOODS PURCHASED FROM THE WEST, BRINGING ABOUT A SIGNIFIANT SURGE IN PRODUCTION IN THESE PARTS, A GOOD INVESTMENT RETURN TO THE MIDEAST, AS IT WERE, AND AN INTERVENING EXPORT-BASED PROSPERITY OR SOME APPROACH THER- TO IN THE COUNTRIES OF THE O.E.C.D. I AM NOT SURE WE HAVE THE ENERGY OR INDIA HAS THE WHILE TO BRING ABOUT SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT, BUT WOULD HOPE WE BOTH MIGHT TRY. THE MOST I WOULD REALLY EXPECT FROM WASHINGTON IS SOME FOLLOW THROUGH ON THE SECRETARY'S REMARKABLE STATEMENT TO THE UNITED NATIONS. AT LEAST GIVE US SOME FERTILIZER SO THAT WE CAN MAKE THE RAJASTHAN DESERT BLOOM AS WELL AS BOOM. MOYNIHAN

UNQUOTE RUSH

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